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## Space Force Popular 1/2

### Members of Congress have been long been seeking the reorganization of the AirForce and the creation of a Space Force to consolidate DoD space activities

(Ralph Millsap, Dr. D. B. Posey, “Organizational Options for the Future Aerospace Force”, Document Published Aerospace Power Journal - Summer 2000, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/millsap.htm)

Critics, however, disagree and have called for a reorganization of the military services through the creation of a separate space force. Some members of Congress seek to create a single voice for space, consolidating all Department of Defense (DOD) space activities. Furthermore, these critics say that a consolidated space force will improve visibility of space programs, increase the space budget, eliminate redundancy, and promote development of space professionals. They also suggest that a new organization will advance space war-fighting capabilities and enhance space support to the war fighter. Critics argue that the Air Force mission has reached a crossroads of air and space operations. Pointing to the post–World War II reorganization that created a new organization with new capabilities, some in Congress believe the time has come for the Air Force to relinquish its claim to space—yielding to a new organization dedicated to space power.

### Congress wants progress in developing space defense capabilities

Defense Daily, Jan. 11, ’06, “Hill Raises Concerns About Space Acquisition, Seeks Alternatives” lexis

Lawmakers expressed growing dissatisfaction in the fiscal 2006 Defense Authorization Bill with the Defense Department's management of space-based technology programs and ordered the Pentagon to come up with new ways for acquiring satellites. In the report, accompanying the defense bill, lawmakers cited "fundamental shortfalls" and a "lack of sufficient improvement" in ensuring the U.S. maintains space dominance. "These areas include, the development of fully qualified and competent space cadre [of defense and contractor workers], improvements in the acquisition system that will restore confidence in the development of our space systems and the creation of operationally responsive space system." Congress has long criticized the Pentagon's management of space programs, which generally involve some of the military's most novel and high- risk technologies. The bill marks the latest attempt by legislators to rein in their costs. Lawmakers found DoD has taken some "positive steps" toward improving space acquisition, but has yet to see significant progress. As a result, they vowed to keep on pressure to develop "an alternative model for space acquisition and system deployment that will increase the production rate of space systems at lower costs." Concerns about acquisition management also forced lawmakers to cut funding for one's of DoD's top space program, the Transformational Satellite Program, the military's next-generation of wide-band satellites than will replace the current Lockheed Martin [LMT] Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite constellation. According to the conference report, lawmakers did not question the need for the next-generation satellite program, but opted to cut $400 million from the president's $835 million request for TSAT due to program concerns. The report noted the cut would likely delay the program by one year, but found that was acceptable because it would provide additional time for integrating key technologies, refining requirements and emphasizing risk reduction. Lawmakers included a provision requiring DoD's National Security Space Office to conduct an independent assessment of options for "enhancing" existing AEHF satellites and Wideband Gapfiller systems, in case TSAT is further delayed. The National Security Space office is then required to conduct an analysis of those alternatives by no later than April 15, 2006. The report also urged expanded development of the operationally responsive satellite systems, which could be assembled and launched on demand. "ORS will stimulate the production of simpler, shorter living satellites thus dramatically reducing costs and shortening schedules," lawmakers said. The bill requires DoD to create or designate an organization that would coordinate payload technology development for smaller ORS satellites. The new entity, known as the Joint Operationally Responsive Space Payload Technology Organization, would draft an annual master plan outlining areas for technology development and allocate dollars for those efforts through the Pentagon's Office of Force Transformation, the bill states. Additionally, lawmakers asked the Pentagon to come up with a plan for Congress by Feb. 28 on establishing a new joint office for the Tactical Satellite Program. The Office of Force Transformation now oversees the TACSAT program.

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### 9-11 and the Space Commission report have made space control popular

Lambeth, Senior Staff Member at Rand & Former Director of Rand’s Interational Security & Defense Policy Program, 2K3 (Benjamin, “Mastering the Ultimate High Ground: Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space,” Prepared for the U.S. Air Force)

It is now widely accepted within the Air Force and among other observers of the space scene that if the Air Force intends to evolve into an “air and space force” worthy of the name, it will soon need to start acquiring at least the beginnings of a serious space control capability, just as it did in the realm of counterair operations during the formative years of air power’s development. Fortunately, the climate for taking the next steps toward space control has become increasingly favorable. The nation’s leadership, by numerous indications (including the Space Commission’s recommendations and the most recent QDR), finally seems disposed to lend a receptive ear toward that end. Moreover, the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 irreversibly altered the conventional wisdom about the character of the external threats the nation faces. Those attacks confirmed beyond doubt that America’s enemies, especially fanatically hostile nonstate enemies, possess the will, if not yet the means, to go to any achievable lengths to harm the most vital U.S. interests. As a result, the long-standing popular reluctance to migrate even defensive force-employment functions to space under any conditions may be gradually losing its former tenacity.

### Congress supports a space defense policy that would counter Chinese space advancements

Dr. Moltz, Deputy Director CNS and Research Professor, 2004 (James, 2-2, Moonstruck: What's Up with U.S. Space Policy? http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040202.htm

Since China's successful launch of its first man in space in October 2003, some influential Republican members of Congress have called for moves to counter China's recent entrance into human space activity, suggesting a resurgent U.S. manned program and possibly new military measures.[2] Such factors have led arms control analysts to wonder whether the Bush speech is simply the camel's nose under the tent for an even more aggressive U.S. space effort, particularly given past statements by senior members of the Bush administration on the need to deploy missile defenses and other weapons in space. As critic Bruce Gagnon argues, "The military has long eyed the Moon as a potential base of operations...."[3] Undoubtedly, more thinking and more specific planning will be required to implement the Bush plan, and Americans will need to have a good reason to back it. At this point, however, it is worth walking through some of the background to the president's speech, examining possible options for implementing a major U.S. Moon initiative, and discussing some of the trade-offs involved in different courses of action (whether civilian or military).

### Space Force makes the President look strong- it would be a popular policy

The Space Review, 2006 (Feb 27th, Taylor Dinerman, “United States Space Force: Sooner Rather Than Later”, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/565/1> )

Leaders inside the Pentagon keep saying that space is the critical backbone of network-centric warfare. The evidence shows that, without space, American global military superiority would not be anywhere near what it is today. Our enemies know this and are working hard to find new ways to damage and degrade US space superiority. To counter this, and to give America a new set of grand strategic options, a new space force is needed: not immediately, but within the next five or ten years. Future presidential candidates, if they want to show they are serious about national security, should consider making this reform part of their platform.

## Space Force Unpopular (Public)

### Satellite hardening is unpopular in Congress- public opinion on the issue proves

Pulham, President & Chief Executive Officer of Space Watch, 2004 (Elliot G, October, Space Watch, Vol 3 No 10, http://news.spacefoundation.org/spacewatch/archive/october2004.htm

"Public opinion in this country is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail. Without it, nothing can succeed." — Abraham Lincoln Great quotes are timeless. Speaking a century before the space age, Former President Lincoln could easily have been explaining why Space-Based Radar (SBR) and Transformational Communications Satellite (TSAT) were recently bludgeoned in Congress, while the NASA space exploration budget was earmarked for funding well in excess of the presidential request. No matter how skilled an industry's lobbyists may be, public opinion is ultimately what frames legislative action. Strong public support for a program does not automatically assure favorable Congressional action, but the absence of public discourse (much less well-formed public opinion) can consign an important program to legislative purgatory, ala SBR and TSAT. Going out on a limb to support a high-risk program is not a politically attractive course of action — especially when public opinion is silent or the case for the program has not been publicly made. This is not to say that behind-the-scenes legislative work is unimportant. Quite the contrary, it is crucial, and our industry is blessed with some of the best legislative experts in the nation. But the best among them would be the first to opine that public opinion shapes the environment in which they must work. If we give them favorable public opinion, then, as Abe said, they cannot fail. Thus the contrast between the decisions to add funding to the NASA budget in one case, while at the same time gutting funds for SBR and TSAT, is highly illuminating. As regards the NASA budget, industry has collaboratively mounted a concerted, enduring, broad-based effort to inform public opinion via the activities of the Coalition for Space Exploration. The coalition's government affairs team and public affairs team have worked hand-in-hand to get a consistent message out — both to Main Street and to The Hill. Public opinion has moved from less than 50 percent in support of the Vision for Space Exploration at the time of its announcement to better than 68 percent today. NASA still faces many challenges and will for years to come. But positive public opinion gives the agency a fighting chance to overcome them. Not so for SBR or TSAT. Our friends at Space News were absolutely correct in taking Congress to task last week for failing to support these vitally important programs. Our national security space programs are at the heart of the asymmetric technology advantage that our armed forces count on to defend the republic in this uncertain world. SBR and TSAT are critical enabling technologies and systems that are vital to the national defense. Unfortunately, public opinion is either ignorant or mute on these points. We cannot fault the Air Force, which is statutorily restricted from program advocacy. Rather, we as an industry need to consider how we might collaboratively work to inform public opinion on these issues so that SBR, TSAT and other crucial national defense space programs are understood and supported going forward. Undoubtedly these issues will be discussed in great detail during Strategic Space 2004 in Omaha next week. This discussion will be crucial to building consensus industry support. Then, we must argue our case in the court of public opinion. Confining our efforts to smoke-filled rooms is a gambit we know can fail miserably — as it has thus far failed our hard-hit commercial satellite-manufacturing sector, which never marshaled public support to combat the debilitating unintended consequences of export control legislation. We cannot take that chance with our nation's defense. Risky or not, expensive or not, programs like SBR and TSAT deserve every American's support.